CASIL NOTES - Special Edition Newsletter - U.S. - Iran Nuclear Talks

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SPECIAL EDITION -- U.S. – Iran: 18 February 2026 

CASIL Notes routinely provides a synopsis of major events and issues or those with the potential to affect the U.S. and perhaps the world, writ large.  The monthly format is simplified for a quick review where the area of the world is noted, followed by the Event with a brief summary as to possible implications.

This is a SPECIAL EDITION – U.S – Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Talks:  This issue focuses on the current U.S. – Iran nuclear weapons talks begun again in Oman on 6 February 2026 and then in Geneva on 17 February.  We will provide a brief synopsis of the talks, what they might achieve, what a “good outcome” from a stability and security perspective, a status of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and what might happen if talks are not successful.

U.S – Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Talks

Objectives for the talks: I characterize these as preliminary negotiations because thus far, the two sides have only agreed to a “framework” for further talks – not any specific agreements.  No deal is, nor should be, expected. This is the first set of talks just to see if Iran is serious about coming to the table for legitimate denuclearization discussions.  These are the second set of direct/indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran since at least 2018 when the U.S. pulled out of the JCPOA.  It should be noted that we tried these talks LESS THAN A YEAR AGO in held in Oman in April 2025 – NO BREAKTHROUGH was reached then

The two sides obviously approach the talks from completely opposite perspectives – Iran doesn’t want to give up its goal of possessing nuclear weapons and the U.S. can’t see a peaceful Middle East if Iran has them.

I give these 6 and 17 February 2026 talks a passing grade (C+) as successful in that the two sides agreed to hold additional talks.  While there are no specifics on the key issues, I believe each side determined that the other is serious enough to continue further talks.  Iran to stall and U.S. to get a viable agreement.

I want to describe “What a ‘good’ nuclear Deal Looks Like”:

 My premise in “good” means Iran has NO nuclear weapons nor a path to get them at the end of the negotiations.

 Any deal the U.S. works must guarantee NO nuclear weapons development at all by Iran.  The Obama-period Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) never did that.  It merely slowed the weapons development in exchange for lifting sanctions and allowing levels of international trade to be reinstated.

 All nuclear weapons engineering, uranium enrichment, and weaponization work must stop.  All facilities must have full and open access. Outside inspectors will need to have full access to all known Iranian nuclear facilities and suspected facilities – immediately!  Iran was great at concealing facilities and work before and during the JCPOA.  Everything in any new deal must be declared and open inspections allowed – immediately.

 There would need to be some limit on missile forces as well, but that will be hard to accomplish.  These missile forces provide Iran the ability to attack across the Middle East and I don’t see them giving up the missiles AND nuclear weapons.

 I am sure Iran will want some assurances of no attacks.  Iran’s economy needs sanctions relief – it wants no strings attached, but its economy is in bad shape  -- probably an understatement.  Mind you it is not enough to make the religious leadership capitulate at this time (they are monetarily insulated from the sanctions), but it is in bad shape.

 Some cite the “Libyan Model” as an example to be used. In the Libyan Model from the early 2000’s, Libya gave up its nuclear weapons program in its entirety – no research, no enrichment, no nuclear aspects at all.  International organizations were allowed in country to conduct comprehensive compliance inspections.   Just as an aside, Iran’s ruling Ayatollah and the Religious Hardliners, look at Moamar Gaddafi being ousted in 2011 in a rebellion as an example of what COULD happen to them, and they are likely hesitant to fully agree to any complete deal.

When you look at all the details I listed above that would go into the “deal” the Trump administration wants, and the complications that leads to for Iranian leadership, I do not see that coming out of any near-term talks.

Important Background -- This is a Status of The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development Program:

 The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), the UN’s nuclear “watchdog” responsible for conducting inspections, released a report in March showing that Iran IS CONTINUING its quest for nuclear weapons.  At the beginning of Israel’s and U.S. Midnight Hammer in June 2025,  Iran had enough uranium enriched to 60% purity to build six (6) – ten (10) nuclear bombs.  All Iran needs to do is go one extra step to enrich the 60% uranium to HEU (up to 90% purity).  That is the grade of material one needs to have fissile material for a nuclear bomb. That next step will take less than three weeks.

 NOTE: No other country – that doesn’t have nuclear weapons – has any uranium enriched above 3% – 5%.  For peaceful purposes there is NO REQUIREMENT for anything higher than that.

 The June 2025 12-Day Israeli air campaign and U.S. operation Midnight Hammer were successful in severely damaging much (not all) of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  It likely set it back years (but not eliminated it).  A KEY QUESTION the U.S. intelligence community (IC)  must answer in current assessments is – how much of the above enriched uranium did Iran move/hide/recover? Depending on that answer, Iran’s program remains viable with modified timelines.  However, the unknown aspect of that information leads to a degree of risk – how much “risk” is one willing to accept?

 Iran already has been developing the missile delivery capability and has one of the largest missile inventories in the world.  It has short, medium, and intermediate range missiles that can threaten (as we’ve seen with attacks on Israel and U.S. facilities in Qatar June 2025) all countries in the Middle East.

-        It is working on an ICBM capability and that’s what its “space program” is trying to help with the technology to have a missile capable of ICBM ranges (reach the U.S.)

 Iran has been working on the technology for building and shaping the inner workings of a nuclear bomb simultaneously with its uranium enrichment process and missile development.  The BIG QUESTION for which Intelligence doesn’t have an answer at this time is:  How far along is Iran in that process?  That is a major concern – what do we NOT know about their progress?

 A current Iranian nuclear weapon fashioned from the above HEU numbers would be in the form of a “dumb bomb” similar to what the U.S. used on Japan to end WW II.

 WHEN Iran decides to “DASH” to a bomb (a term commonly used to describe how long it will take Iran to have a bomb from the decision to make a bomb), they can have the HEU in less than three weeks and an operational nuclear weapon anywhere from a few weeks after that out to approximately six (6) months – or less for a crude device. For having a better weapon, I would assess, likely well less than a year.

 To Iran, a nuclear weapon helps its security and allows it to reign supreme over the Middle East. It wants a nuclear weapon, in part, to help further its objective of establishing the Shia Crescent across the Middle East.   It also would give it great leverage in any military confrontation.

  Why can’t Iran have a nuclear weapon – the big (strategic) picture?

It would change the security dynamics in the entire Middle East. The dynamics of these past 28 months of war with Israel-Hamas, Israel-Hezbollah, Israel-Houthis and Israel-Iran, U.S.-Houthis, etc… would be completely different if the radical regime in Iran possessed nuclear weapons.  I’m not sure the old MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) maxim that kept the U.S. and Soviet Union from using them against one another would apply to a less stable, less logical and more radical Iran.

Israel would want to attack Iran.  Israel WILL attack if Iran gets nuclear weapons. Iran has threatened the destruction of Israel, so why would Israel wait to see if Iran attacks with nuclear weapons? Iran could hold the threat of a nuclear attack over Israel’s head while conducting smaller conventional attacks or attacks using Hezbollah. 

There are regional neighbors Iran has threatened to attack conventionally who will want/need some protection and can pay to get it.  While it may seem far-flung, there are even some scenarios where you could see Saudi Arabia using its massive wealth to BUY a nuclear weapon from Pakistan.  Nothing would prevent that.  There are religious motivations and anti-Iranian sentiment that make that scenario plausible.  If that happens, you will then have two nuclear powered nations with weapons aimed at one another across a very short distance.

 What about UAE?  What about a nuclear alliance between several countries.  When does a conventional threat go nuclear?  This is a very unstable region to throw a nuclear weapon held by a radical and unstable regime race into the mix.  What other countries enter the arms race?

Other Diplomatic Concerns:

It’s not just the Iran nuclear weapons program that should be on the table.

Here are some other points which must me considered based on Iran’s radical, destabilizing and deadly actions for the past 47 years:  (Not necessarily in order of U.S. priorities)

1. Stop the slaughter of its people; There is no way Iran has stopped the killing and imprisonment. It is just not on full public display since we can’t see everything happening inside Iran at this time – due to internet shutdown.

2. Cease its nuclear weapons program and turn over all aspects of that except for peaceful power program needs,

3. Reduce its massive missile force (Iran has more missiles [and UAVs/Drones]) than are needed for any type of defensive capability;

4. Stop its destabilizing activity across the entire Middle East – from down in Yemen to over with Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas (and all the proxies it still controls in Iraq and Syria) and finally,

5. Remove this fanatical religious authoritarian regime.

What happens if diplomacy fails?

If the Trump administration is serious in its military threats (as it was in June 2025), then military action should follow. I want to point out that I’m not arguing for military action (I fought two wars in the Middle East and realize the costs – human and resources), but it sometimes cannot be avoided – if avoiding it results in a worse outcome.

The Trump Administration can’t keep up the bluster and throwing out meaningless threats and then not back them up would result in the U.S. losing all credibility and lose the critical deterrence effect.  This would show Iran it can stall for time (which it is doint), it will also show our other adversaries (not just Iran, but Russia, China, and N. Korea) that the U.S. isn’t prepared to back up its tough talk.

Having said the above, I would say there is a better than 50% chance of military – including cyber attacks -- action against Iran.

Any operation would be COMPLEX:

The U.S. in in the process of building significant military capability in the Middle East that would facilitate both a sustained offensive military campaign as well as providing a strong defensive capability.

Iran is likely at its weakest defensive status since the 1979 revolution.  That’s not to say Iran doesn’t have a military capability to attack – look at the thousands of missiles in its inventory.  I’m addressing its ability to defend against a sophisticated air campaign having been severely weakened – thanks in large part to Israel’s attacks last year.

I need to point out that Iran doesn’t keep all its nuclear facilities in the same location.  There are some major concentrations for sure, but there are also dispersed across other military facilities in the country (such as ones Israel struck – with little fanfare before June) while hitting other targets last year. Iran also intersperses some facilities inside population centers making targeting them very difficult to try and avoid collateral damage.  A revisit of those June 2025 targets would be a prudent military move in any attack.

The U.S. does have contingency plans for such a requirement, but I won’t release those details.  However, it’s obvious this would have to be an aerial bombing campaign that went after all of Iran’s nuclear facilities including – those deeply buried locations in Esfahan, Natanz, Fordow and others (enrichment facilities deep inside mountains in central and western Iran) and missile facilities. I use the term “campaign” to mean this would have to be a series of strikes over a period of days or weeks to ensure success.  Since Iran has continued nuclear weapons development in secret and intelligence must ensure we have all the targets identified before beginning.  For example, the campaign would also have to target laboratories and engineering facilities that are collocated with regular looking military facilities (like the one Israel took out last year in one of its strikes on a missile facility, but there was a key nuclear weapons research facility located there as well).

This would be a complex operation and not without risk.  However, Israel did help last year by destroying the most advance Iranian (Russian provided) air defense capabilities. Iran is trying to get replacements from Russia and likely will, but for the near-term, Iran remains at its weakest defensive posture since the 1979 revolution.  This could be a unilateral U.S. operation or combined with Israel – which would add to the complexity.

Everyone must realize Iran WILL retaliate. 

- Israel will be a top target for Iranian missile retaliation and likely attacks from the Iranian-back Shia militias.

- U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria and other countries in the Middle East would likely also be targeted – along with the host countries for “allowing” the U.S. to conduct attacks from their soil.

- I would also expect a strong Cyber-attack from Iran.  At the very least, such an attack would be very disruptive if not destructive to some infrastructure.

 - And let’s not forget something I’ve said for some time, and that is that Iran will also likely loop in delayed counterattacks by weeks, months or years.  It still has an objective to retaliate for the 2020 U.S. killing of Qasem Soleimani – it still desires to kill President Trump and several of his senior advisors at the time.

CONCLUSION:

As you can see, this is a complex issue with many moving and interrelated elements.  Diplomacy is the first and safest approach to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  However, one cannot realistically remove the military option from the equation because an emboldened Iran or an Iran with nuclear weapons does not end well for the Middle East, Israel or the U.S.

Mark S. Chandler